In this Letter we present the first implementation of a quantum coin-tossing protocol. This protocol belongs to a class of ''two-party'' cryptographic problems, where the communication partners distrust each other. As with a number of such two-party protocols, the best implementation of the quantum coin tossing requires qutrits, resulting in a higher security than using qubits. In this way, we have also performed the first complete quantum communication protocol with qutrits. In our experiment the two partners succeeded to remotely toss a row of coins using photons entangled in the orbital angular momentum. We also show the experimental bounds of a possible cheater and the ways of detecting him.
In the original ''coin-tossing'' protocol, Alice and Bob had just divorced and did not want to ever see each other again but they had to decide who kept the dog [1] . As they did not trust any third party as a referee, they agreed to toss a coin. How could Bob be sure that Alice is honest when she said ''It was tails. . .you lost'' if he could not see the outcome of the toss? This protocol belongs to a set of novel cryptographic problems like mail certification, remote contract signing, and mental poker, where, instead of ruling out an eavesdropper, the problem is that the communicating partners do not trust each other. Other examples of this so called ''post cold war'' protocols are ''bit commitment'' or the computation of a function with distributed inputs [2] .
This kind of protocol is receiving increased attention from the cryptographic and quantum information communities. Although the perfect security of some ''twoparty'' protocols seems impossible [3] , it is unclear which bounds can be imposed on the security. Also, it has been suggested that quantum mechanics can be derived from purely quantum information postulates, like the security of quantum key distribution and the impossibility of perfect quantum bit commitment [4] .
In a solution for coin tossing Alice throws the coin, locks it in a ''box'' and sends it to Bob, who has the proof that the coin was thrown, but cannot see the actual result. Bob makes his bet and, upon receiving it, Alice sends the key to Bob, who unlocks the result [5] . In general, there is no classical protocol which allows unrestricted security against cheating for the coin-tossing protocols.
In quantum coin tossing [7, 6, [8] [9] [10] , we replace the box by a quantum state. Alice encodes the result of the throw of the coin by choosing one among a series of nonorthogonal states and sends it to Bob. Without previous knowledge, Bob cannot know with certainty which of the states he possesses. At this point, Bob makes his bet. To ''unlock'' the state, Alice now tells Bob which state she sent and then he measures it to check Alice's honesty.
If Bob's measurement identifies Alice's predicted state, the protocol is a success. Otherwise, Alice and Bob consider the throw as a ''failure''. Contrary to the classical case, this coin tossing scheme limits the chances of a cheater to succeed. We will show that cheating can be detected when the failures increase over the statistical errors.
Our implemented protocol is based on a proposal by Ambainis [6] using three-dimensional quantum states (''qutrits''). The series of states that Alice can send and the correspondent throw of the coin are presented in the table shown in Fig. 1 Alice's states of the corresponding set, a third orthogonal state. These additional states are crucial for increasing the chances to detect cheating, as we will show below.
The maximum probability that one of the partners biases the result without being noticed is 25% [6] . This limits the theoretical probability of a cheater to win to 75% since in any coin tossing the probability to win is 50% anyway. Spekkens and Rudolph [7] proofed that no similar protocol, i.e., strong coin-tossing protocols based on bit commitment where Alice supplies the state, can improve the security and, in particular, using qubits instead of qutrits will always make the protocol more insecure. On the other hand the effect of noise in any protocol reduces the security [11] . For example a noisy qutrit protocol can be less secure than a perfect qubit protocol. We will show below that our experiment was robust enough to noise and was more secure than any similar qubit protocol. It is yet unclear if new protocols based on completely different schemes could perform better, either with qunits or with qubits. This raises the interesting question of which problems can be more efficiently solved with higher dimensional states [12] .
In our proof of principle experiment ( Fig. 2 ), Alice possesses a source of orbital angular momentum entangled photons [13, 14] . She keeps one photon of each pair and sends the other one to Bob. By projecting her photon onto a certain state, she nonlocally projects Bob's photon onto any state of the states shown in Fig. 1 . The detection of the photon by Alice is the signal which confirms that a suitable photon carrying an orbital angular momentum qutrit has been sent to Bob [15] . Alice sends the electronic triggering signal to Bob. Once Bob receives the signal, he sends his bet to Alice. Now she tells Bob which was the state. Then Bob measures the state of the photon and verifies the honesty of Alice. A final coincidence measurement between the electronic signals from Alice and Bob is needed to check if all the steps were performed correctly.
An argon-ion laser pumps a 1.5-mm-thick -bariumborate crystal cut for Type I phase matching. The crystal emits down-converted pairs of identically polarized photons ( 702 nm) at an angle of 4 off the pump direction. These photons are entangled in the orbital angular momentum. We use the substate ' 0:7j0 A 0 B i 0:5j1 A 1 B i 0:5j2 A 2 B i, where j0 A i and j0 B i correspond to Gaussian beams and j1 A i and j2 B i (j2 A i and j1 B i) are Laguerre Gaussian beams with azimuthal index m 1 (m ÿ1) [16] . With a series of beam splitters, whose reflectances were chosen so that the photons were equally distributed among the final paths, both parties direct their photons probabilistically to holograms and single mode fibers, each projecting the photon onto a certain state [17] .
Bob's photons were directed randomly to a projection onto one of his six possible states. The detections were electronically discriminated with the information provided by Alice by a coincidence measurement. We programmed the logic to only consider those photons detected by Bob which are exactly timed with Alice's electronic signal and to disregard the photons on Bob's side going to the wrong basis.
Alice and Bob decided to try their coin-tossing protocol with a row of throws. In this experiment they obtained 50% heads (1) and 44% tails (0). As Bob's guesses were random, he won in half of the throws. The overall failures in the protocol around 6% of the throws are mainly due to slight misalignments. In Fig. 3(a) we present the typical experimental probabilities. In Fig. 4(a) , we show a set of and white (tails) bars correspond to proper throws and indicate the result of the tossing. In (a) Alice is honest. She sends the state j0i j1i= 2 p (Heads). The errors in this case are due to misalignments of the setup and are intrinsic to it. In (b) Alice is cheating. She always sends a mixture of two states. After Bob makes his bet, she decides which state she must tell him. In this case she claims to have sent state j0i j2i= 2 p .
the actual throws. Every square of the image represents a throw of the coin. The level of security of the protocol is given by the noise of our experiment [7, 11] . The security against Alice cheating depends on the trace distance (D) and the security against Bob cheating depends on the fidelity (F) between the density matrices sending a ''1'' and sending a ''0''. In our kind of protocols, using qubits limits the possible states to D F 2 > 1 [12] . Values of D and F, violating this inequality mean that we are accessing a security not allowed by qubits. If our experiment were noiseless we would obtain D 0:5 and F 0:5 which is the best security achievable up to now. By modeling the 6% noise found in our experiment as completely incoherent we obtain D F 2 0:91 which is still better than the security that could be achieved with any similar protocol using qubits, even a noiseless one. One fact which helped to bound the security was the use of a fair protocol, where Alice and Bob have the same chances of cheating.
We further experimentally explored the security of our implementation. For us it was a harder problem to devise a cheating procedure than to prepare the honest protocol. The best way we could find for Alice to cheat was the following one. Alice always sends a random symmetric mixture of the state j0i ÿ j1i= 2 p and the state j0i j2i= 2 p , which is a random mixture of heads or tails [18] . When Bob makes his bet, Alice always tells him that he lost, and then, Bob has to measure in the corresponding basis. For example, if Bob says that it was tails, Alice's answer is that the state was heads (j0i ÿ j1i= 2 p ), and Bob measures in this basis. It is an easy task to check that Alice will win in 62.5% of the throws only, which is below the theoretical maximum of 75% [7, 6] . This strategy resembles a biased coin which can be flipped even after Bob made his choice.
In order to force Alice to cheat, we changed states A11 and A22 to be identical to states A21 and A12, respectively. Alice does not need to keep a record of which state is being sent. In this way she sends a probabilistic mixture of the two states. Her strategy is to tell Bob that the state sent was exactly the opposite of Bob's bet.
In practice it is even harder for Alice to win, because she cannot turn off the statistical errors which also happen in the honest protocol. In our case the number of failures, when Alice cheats in this way, was 46% of the throws. The difference with the expected failures is mainly due to the fact that Alice is not sending a perfect mixture of the two states. Figure 3(b) shows Bob's results for one of the two states Alice claimed she was sending. Also, we present the actual row of throws in Fig. 4(b) . By comparing the results presented in images (a) and (b) it was very easy for Bob to discover that in (b) the protocol was not followed honestly. Also, it was a little bit suspicious to him that in all the proper throws of Fig. 4(b) , Alice won.
At this point, let us turn back to Fig. 3(b) . We note that the state in which most of the failures go is precisely the one outside the plane defined by the elements of Alice's set. Evidently in this case, the use of a three-dimensional space is necessary in order that Bob can detect Alice cheating.
We now discuss a few details of our implementation. In a proper protocol, the detection of the photon by Bob should be delayed until after he sent his bet to Alice. In our setup, it was difficult to prepare such a delay and so we simulated it by software. Future implementations should include an optical delay.
Another difference with respect to an ideal implementation is that both Alice and Bob could not deterministically project their photon onto a given state. Although this is not a problem for an honest Alice, who chooses at random which state to send among the possible four, it might present a security hazard when one of the parties cannot be trusted. A closer look shows that this is not the case. Photons going to the wrong basis or photons simply not detected are considered as failures in our scheme thus they cannot increase the odds of winning by a dishonest player.
A possible problem of this implementation would be if too many photons are lost in a game were only one coin is played. Then the players cannot reach any conclusion even if they both play fairly because the likelihood that a failure comes from cheating would be low. This problem can be solved using better detectors, fast optical switches and mode sorters [19] to avoid the loss of photons. This will also increase the signal to noise ratio, improving the security. A better method would be a protocol where the two parties throw a large row of coins [20] . As in our case, Bob will project randomly the incoming photon onto different bases and store the result, even if the photon went to a wrong bases. Then Bob can use a tomographic estimation to check the states Alice announced. Both Bob and Alice can also count the photons lost during the communication and check if their number corresponds to the known experimental loses.
In conclusion, we have experimentally demonstrated a ''quantum coin-tossing'' protocol. To our knowledge, this is the first two-party communication protocol which is solved using the laws of quantum physics to encode the communication. Contrary to the usual ''key distribution'' protocols, here the information shared by Alice and Bob is directly exchanged through the quantum states. Also, this protocol is the first one implemented where the use of more than two dimensions presents a clear advantage. Using our setup we were able to share a few tens of thousands of coin throws in a few seconds between two parties. We also allowed one party to try to cheat, which was easily detected through a significant increase of failures. We hope that this work triggers systematic investigations of the possibilities open to dishonest parties. We showed that, although the application of such a protocol in a single coin throw experiment to settle the ''who keeps the dog problem'' is of a confined interest, in a more elaborated application where many random bits are needed it would be easy to detect a cheater. This kind of system could include the case were Alice is the dealer of coins to many different Bob's. All the players should be able to see what the previous results were. Our test experiment was confined to the dimensions of an optical table. In order to send the information over long distances one should use more elaborated systems using, e.g., adaptative optics or specially designed fibers.
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